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Part 2 The Atomic Bomb

1. Black Ash and Black Rain
(1). Black Ash
(2). Black Rain
2. Radiosondes
3. Psychological Warfare Leaflets
4. Unimplemented Fire Bombing and Other Bombing Plans

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1.Black Ash and Black Rain

(1)Black Ash

The Nagasaki Fire Department records state that “the noise of crashing objects followed the flash of light, and a cloud of dust arose, obscuring the city for a short time.” Called kurobokori (“black dust”), this dust was comprised of ashes from objects burned by the flash of heat generated by the atomic bomb, as well as dust from various light materials such as paper and cloth. Although the exact distribution is unknown, it is estimated that the dust extended to a distance of about 1,500 m from the hypocenter. This estimate is mainly based on the fact that slips of paper from the Mitsubishi Arms Factory Ōhashi Plant and Mitsubishi Nagasaki Steelworks were discovered far from their original location. The atomic bomb exploded approximately 500 m over the surface of the ground, generating a huge windstorm of some 3,000 m in diameter.
　Carried away by the southwest wind (3 m/s), the black ash and light materials reached communities to the northeast of Nagasaki such as Yagami, Toishi, Koga, Tayui and Enoura, well beyond the mountain ranges surrounding the city.
　Many pieces of paper were found in Yagami (currently part of Nagasaki City). For example, one-yen and ten-yen bills were found near shelters in Utsutsugawa. Moreover, on his way from a visit to his patients, Mori Masaki, a physician practicing in Yagami, was surprised to find papers of various sizes scattered in the fields, streets and on building roofs. Among these he found medical records that should have been stored at Nagasaki Medical College Hospital, suggesting that the hospital had been destroyed by the bomb.
　Records kept by Yagami Elementary School state that “five or six minutes after the blast, pieces of calligraphy works and pictures painted by school children in the hypocenter area floated down onto Yagami Elementary School. Like flower petals on the wind, pieces of the burned notebooks used by medical college students also floated to the ground. The scene was unforgettable.”
　Also found in Yagami were slips of paper from the Mitsubishi Arms Factory Ōhashi Plant and the Mitsubishi Nagasaki Steelworks bearing the Mitsubishi mark, pieces of paper from fusuma (sliding screens), Urakami Railroad Station invoices, packaging paper printed with the name of a kimono merchant in Hamaguchi-machi, and postcards.
　The black ash traveled even further than the pieces of paper, reaching areas as distant as Kawachi in Toishi Village, Uwatoko in Koga Village (both currently part of Nagasaki City) and Hiraki in Enoura Village (currently part of Isahaya City). The ashes lay so thick in these areas that the sweet potato fields looked white and it was possible to write words with a finger on the leaves of potato plants.
　Pieces of cloth and paper were also found in Kikitsu Village (currently part of Isahaya City) and Isahaya City.

(2)Black Rain

Few academic documents remain to shed light on the subject of black rain in Nagasaki, except the phenomenon at Nishiyama-machi 4-chōme, the area famous for its high level of residual radioactivity, and the notebook kept by Dr. Nishina Yoshio. Nishina wrote as follows: “Nagasaki. Rain in the east. Sprinkling rain, obviously a bomb effect.”
　Regarding the phenomenon of black rain observed after the Hiroshima atomic bombing, a research group of the Science Council of Japan reports as follows:

In many areas, it began to rain 20 to 60 minutes after the bomb flash. In some areas, however, it began to rain 120 minutes after the bombing, perhaps due to convergent updrafts generated by the fires after the bombing. It rained partly because of updrafts generated as a direct effect of the bombing and partly as a result of the fires, a secondary effect of the bombing… The rain had very peculiar features. At first it contained something black like mud in considerable quantities and was sticky to the touch. After the rain had been falling for one to two hours, its color began to fade until it finally turned clear like ordinary rain.

Aside from the amount of rainfall, the features, timing and duration of the black rain in Hiroshima were almost identical to those of the black rain in Nagasaki.
　Various memoirs and testimonies indicate that it rained in the following areas: the hill behind Nagasaki Medical College Hospital, Motohara-machi, Anakōbō Temple, Mt. Kompira and Nishiyama-machi 4-chōme. Moreover, it rained in the area around Keihō Middle School to the west, as well as in the area around Sumiyoshi Tunnel Factory and Kawahira in the north. In the southeast, it rained lightly in Tera-machi.
　In Kawahira, it rained in the area from Odorise to around Kawahira Branch School. At the time of the explosion, Iwamoto Yoshito, a teacher at Nishiurakami Elementary School, happened to be at the Kawahira Branch School talking with his colleagues in the corridor. Iwamoto says that although he does not remember exactly when it began to rain, he left the school after a while, and noted that it was already raining. He continues that raindrops fell lightly for several minutes, although he does not remember whether the rain was black.
　Black rain also fell in Motohara-machi. Sasaki Takashi, a third-year student at Nagasaki Medical College at the time, witnessed black rain with four or five of his fellow students on a street behind the Urakami Daiichi Hospital (currently St. Francis Hospital). They were on their way to a shelter after suffering injuries at the Nagasaki Medical College Hospital.
　In the area from the hill behind Nagasaki Medical College Hospital in Sakamoto-machi to Anakōbō (elevation 80 m), it rained several times intermittently, from right after the bombing until late into the night. Various collections of atomic bomb testimonies published by organizations related to Nagasaki Medical College include references to black rain. The authors use phrases such as “blackish rain,” “rain from the black sky,” and “sticky rain-like oil” to describe the black rain resulting from updrafts generated by the atomic bombing.
　Many people fled from Nagasaki Medical College and its attached hospital to the aforementioned area. Hoisting flags made on the spot, they spent the night in potato patches and grass fields in the area, without tents or any other shelter. Anakōbō Temple is approximately one kilometer southeast of the hypocenter. Nagasaki Medical College and the attached hospital are located between Anakōbō and the hypocenter, about 0.5 km from the latter.
　The following are excerpts from these testimonies. Writes Tanimoto Hiroharu, a fourth-year student at Nagasaki Medical College at the time:

The bleeding from my head stopped and I felt a little better. When I left the air-raid shelter near the ophthalmology department and looked around, the injured were climbing up the mountain behind the college to seek shelter at Anakōbō. It seemed that a relief unit had been established at the top of the mountain.
　Worrying about Tanaka Toshiyuki, who had been lying in a room in the ophthalmology department, I went there and found that he was still unconscious, with his eyes open. I slapped his cheek hard and he regained consciousness. I said ‘Tanaka, follow me. If you stay here, you’ll die,’ but he tried to cling to my neck. I drummed up my strength and carried him on my back to the relief unit. The unit was very busy taking care of the countless injured, so I asked Kaieda Yoshiharu, a third-year student who was helping at the unit, to take care of Tanaka. Then I then rushed to Anakōbō, without receiving treatment for my injury.
　After a while, the weather turned bad and big raindrops began to fall. My classmate Sugihara Masamichi was in front of me at the time. Perhaps out of thirst, he caught raindrops in his hands and drank the water. Several students around me also drank raindrops to relieve their thirst.
　When I looked down from the top of the mountain, I witnessed black columns of smoke rising from the basic education department building; it seemed that the building had been completely destroyed. I also saw several fires blazing in the hospital.

Umoto Isao, a fourth-year student at Nagasaki Medical College at the time, describes the situation as follows:

I hurried along the ash-strewn path to the hill, home to the Kōhoku and Kōnan hospital wards. A fire had already started in the main building. On the way to the wards, I found that fires had also started in the dermatology and surgery departments. Along the way I saw some students groaning with pain and others absently looking at the fires with their upper bodies bent forward. I rushed with unsteady steps, thinking I could get to Anakōbō from behind the hill of Kōnan ward.
　‘Come on, don’t give up!’ I shouted in the fields when I saw a group of people. Some had sunk down to the ground as if every bit of strength had left them; others lay motionless on the ground. All had swollen, dark-red faces and tattered clothing. Some of the men lying on the ground were dying. ‘Come on! Don’t give up’ I shouted again. The words were directed not only toward them but also toward myself. My left leg hurt. Realizing that I was bleeding, I took off my gaiter and wrapped the cloth firmly around my leg.
　‘Umoto, are you OK?’ asked Professor Shirabe. I was delighted to find that he was alive and safe. ‘There’s medicine in this first-aid bag,’ I said. He said something in response but then returned to the college hospital, where some of his patients remained despite the fires.
　Looking down at the hospital, I saw that it was already engulfed in flames. To the right of the hospital was the Yamazato hillside neighborhood, also engulfed in flames. Fanned by the wind, the fire columns shot high in the air and spread to the basic education department building and the hill where Urakami Cathedral was standing. I watched the fires absent-mindedly. Fires had also broken out in Matsuyama-machi, Shiroyama-machi and Ibinokuchi, merging into a huge conflagration that lit the sky over Nagasaki very brightly.
　I continued to climb up the mountain, but it was quite steep. With every step, I took a deep breath. Wind blew from the foot of the mountain and big raindrops began to fall. It was very cold. Shivering, I pulled my hat down over my eyes, but my clothing was tattered, leaving my shoulders and back exposed. I felt very sick and vomited everything that I had eaten. After a while, I felt nauseous again and threw up gastric acid. I continued climbing up the mountain for a little while but threw up again, although this time nothing came out. I felt like my stomach was in a vice. When I had somehow managed to climb about 80% of the mountain, I could no longer walk and fell onto the grass nearby. I felt cold raindrops falling on my face and saw black clouds floating in a red sky. Behind the clouds the sun looked dark red.
　‘Hey, are you OK?’ I heard a man asking and calling my name, but since I was almost unconscious, the voice did not register clearly. The man checked my condition, gave me an injection of a heart stimulant that had been in my first-aid bag, and then patted me on the shoulder. When I managed to open my eyes slowly, I found that the man was Dr. Morisawa, head of the Kageura group in the department of internal medicine.

The following is an excerpt from the testimony of Dr. Shirabe Raisuke, professor of surgery at Nagasaki Medical College at the time:

We had Dr. Tsuno’o [medical college president] lie down in the middle of the scorched potato patch. Fortunately, we were able to cover him with a quilt that someone had brought. There was a stiff breeze, and he looked cold. Dr. Ōkura soon came along, looking healthy, and built a hut from the potato vines and put up a ‘headquarters’ flag nearby.
　About this time the wind changed direction. The smoke cleared, allowing a clear view of the area below. Flames engulfed the nurses’ dormitory, hospital corridors, basic science building and other structures. The sun glowed in a sickening brownish-red color. People’s faces were also blackish red, as though stained with sunset colors.
　Somebody brought a first-aid bag. I found ampoules of iodine inside and used them to treat the president’s wounds. He had two lacerations on the head and four on the left thigh, plus countless other small cuts all over his body. I spread iodine over the wounds. The three-by-five centimeter laceration on his left buttocks was sullied with dirt and so I rinsed it with rivanol antiseptic. He began to feel better, and the nausea subsided. The wounds on his hand were also due to glass splinters. Two were cuts of about 1.5 cm x 0.5 cm on the back of the hand, and the other was a cut on the knuckle of the middle finger. These had already been disinfected by Dr. Ichinose, and so I left them the way they were.
　The wind began once again to blow up toward the top of the mountain. Rain began to fall, like a passing shower, but not heavily enough to warrant action. The wounded on the hillside were all shivering from the rain and wind. I took a break and went to look for my son Kōji (a first-year medical student) on the other hill across a small valley. In the recess of the mountain, I found Dr. Ishizaki lying like a corpse bundled up in a white hospital quilt. I could not carry him alone. A patient from my clinic had escaped injury and fled to the valley with his wife to avoid the rain. When I greeted him, he responded happily and gave me a handful of cigarettes.
　I went to the hill behind the psychiatric department, crying ‘Kōji!’ in a loud voice, but there was no answer. I shuddered, thinking that he had perhaps been trapped under the debris of the auditorium and perished in the subsequent fire.
　There were innumerable people, injured beyond any hope of help, lying in the fields and on the roadside. Most of them could not even talk. A fourth-year medical student named Oku was lying at the bottom of a cliff. He seemed to be unconscious and would not answer my calls. Rainwater was dripping from overhanging weeds onto his face but he did not wipe it away. He did not have long to live. A third-year student named Ueno was wearing a bandage on his head. Although not as energetic as usual, he was attending diligently to the needs of a friend. Dr. Hidaka of my department was uninjured and kindly assisted in my search for my son. But it was to no avail. As I feared, he had probably burned to death under the collapsed roof of the assembly hall.

Kaneko Masako, a staff member of the physical medicine course in Dr. Shirabe’s department of surgery at the time, describes the situation as follows:

I hadn’t seen anyone from the physical medicine course yet. Where was Dr. Nagai? Where were the other staff members? Hearing the injured shouting the names of their parents and friends, I continued searching for my coworkers. When I reached the top of the mountain, I finally found Dr. Nagai alive and safe; he had already started medical relief efforts. I also found Head Nurse Hisamatsu and Ms. Hashimoto and Ms. Tsubakiyama. I was too relieved to say anything and sat down on the ground. Dr. Nagai, patting me on the shoulder, said ‘You’re alive. Great! I’m relieved! But Ms. Moriuchi and Ms. Sakita of the physical medicine course in the dermatology department were nowhere to be seen. Nor could I find Kozasa Tomie of the physical medicine course in the obstetrics and gynecology department, whom I heard had gone looking for me. Ms. Sakita, who had broken her thigh, was taken to the dermatology department’s shelter. Dr. Shi and Ms. Tomokiyo were making efforts to rescue Dr. Tsuno’o. Shi Keisei carried Ms. Umezu, who had been seriously injured, up the hill. However, I couldn’t find the other nurses: Ms. Hama, Ms. Yamashita, Ms. Yoshida, Ms. Inoue or Ms. Ōyagi. I understood that they had been tending the vegetable gardens cultivated in the former track field at the college, and I assumed that they had gone there that day as well. Moreover, I couldn’t account for three first-year students in the nursing course.
　In the evening, it began to rain, mercilessly soaking those who had sustained severe burns and managed to escape to the top of the hill. Although they welcomed the rain at first as a way to quench their thirst, they soon began to shiver and complain of the cold and to cry that the raindrops stung their wounds. I couldn’t do anything for them. There was no clothing to protect them from the rain. All I could do was to gently put potato vines, instead of clothing, over them.
　Relief units had to be organized by those who were alive and capable. Dr. Nagai suddenly stood up and took a bloodstained bed sheet that someone had brought from the hospital and made a flag out of it. He then tied the flag firmly to a bamboo pole, which he stuck into the ground. Not only those who were safe, but also the injured and dying gathered under the flag for comfort. Then Dr. Nagai began to organize relief units.

Nagai Michio, a third-year student in the Medical Course at the time, describes the situation as follows:

Around 4:00 p.m., I left for Nagasaki Prefecture Headquarters with my friend Kobayashi to ask the authorities to provide food for the injured. We found the neighborhood engulfed in flames and so made a detour, climbed over a mountain, then rushed to the air-raid shelter in Tateyama-machi being used as official headquarters. On the way, we saw many victims but only shouted ‘hang on!’ and continued running. When we felt thirsty, we ate cucumbers from a field.
　Since I had worked at the headquarters in the past as a messenger from Nagasaki Medical College, we were able to meet with the chief, Mr. Mizogoshi. We reported the situation at the college and asked him to provide food for 500 persons. With the help of the police, we were able to return to the college with enough dry biscuits for 500 persons.
　Around 5:00 p.m., we began to distribute the biscuits. At the same time, Prof. Shirabe was making rice balls in the temple at Anakōbō and distributing them.
　By this time, the hospital had been consumed by fire. Nursing course students led by Assistant Prof. Nagai made temporary shelters for the night and prepared meals. Using iron helmets, they boiled potatoes and pieces of pumpkin, seasoning the stew with salt that the head nurse Ms. Hisamatsu had happened to bring with her. It was already dark by the time they finished distributing this simple meal.
　With rain falling in the darkness, we ate the potato and pumpkin stew sitting in fields and on the ground. After a while, under the leadership of Dr. Nagai, we began to sing Umiyukaba and other patriotic songs. Choked with tears, we sang at the top of our voices, hoping that the songs would encourage everyone in Nagasaki that night. But even during the songs, we could hear people sorrowfully calling the names of their friends and teachers in the darkness.

On Mt. Kompira, it began to rain about 40 minutes after the bombing. Nakamura Yoshimitsu, measuring instrument chief of the High-Angle Gun Bunker 4th Company at a place called “Hirogari-yama,” describes his experience as follows:

I rushed from the bunker to the barracks. On the way I saw Private First Class Koga, who had sustained injuries all over his back. He ran into the bunker crying in pain, his face distorted. When I reached the barracks, I found that one of the buildings facing the bunker had been completely destroyed. Some soldiers were shouting for help from under the debris; others were covered with blood and glass shards from the shattered windows; some had burns so severe that they looked like unpainted clay dolls. The roofs of all the buildings had been blown off; the scene was horrifying. In the area facing the garden, I saw one of my comrades with limbs and abdomen covered with blood. Almost everyone except me seemed to be injured, so I received orders from an officer, apparently Second Lieutenant Ono, to go to prefectural headquarters to call for help. I was also ordered to contact headquarters from the anti-aircraft units behind Kompira Shintō Shrine; the communication line between headquarters and the barracks was disconnected. I rushed to the anti-aircraft units, which were approximately 800 m from the barracks. Passing in front of the military guardhouse, I saw shocking scenes in the forests along the way. Not only short but also tall trees had been blown down, blocking the path and making it difficult to proceed. Some of the fallen trees were pines with thick trunks approximately one meter in diameter. One of them had snapped in half; the others were uprooted.
　When I passed in front of the shrine and approached the units, I saw that the sky over Urakami was covered in smoke from fires. Although there were no clouds in the sky, large raindrops began to splatter on the ground. Wondering why it was raining while the sun was shining, I looked up at the sky. A raindrop came down into my eye and caused it to sting. I was surprised by this strange phenomenon and noted that the raindrops that fell on my bare arms and shoulders left spots after drying. It rained for only a short time. I assumed that the rain had been due to the fires in Nagasaki and that the raindrops contained ashes that had billowed into the sky over Urakami. Actually, I still believe that.

Nishiyama-machi 4-chōme, right behind the summit of Mt. Kompira, was approximately 2.5 km east of the hypocenter. The Special Academic Research Group of the Science Council of Japan, which conducted research on the rainfall in Nishiyama-machi 4-chōme, later reported as follows: “Nishiyama-machi 4-chōme was located downwind at the time (wind speed of 3 m/s). Rain began to fall at approximately 20 minutes after the bombing. The findings suggest that, together with dust stirred up from the city of Nagasaki, radioactive material fell to the ground.”
　Radioactive material was detected in the soil at Nishiyama-machi 4-chōme, suggesting that black rain had fallen heavily in the area shortly after the bombing. Nishiyama-machi 4-chōme thus serves as an academically important location.

2. Radiosondes

The American forces dropped three “radiosondes” by parachute over Nagasaki to measure blast pressure and other parameters, and the U.S. military base in Guam quickly received signals from these devices, thereby confirming the success of the atomic bombing of Nagasaki. Even after the explosion of the atomic bomb, the radiosondes continued to drift in the sky.
　Nagasaki Prefecture officials were unable to identify the drifting objects and assumed at first that they were bombs with parachutes. The report sent to the Kyūshū District Government-General in Fukuoka includes the following comment:

Around 11:30 a.m., shortly after the enemy aircraft bombed Nagasaki, three bombs were dropped by parachute over an area five kilometers north of Toishi Village, Kitatakaki County. One of the bombs exploded at an altitude of 1,000 m; the other two failed to explode and dropped into the forest in Toishi Village.

The military police in Nagasaki also reported on the radiosondes. Unlike the Nagasaki Prefecture report, which suggested that one of the “bombs” had exploded, the military police mention “three unexploded bombs believed to be new-type bombs.” It would turn out later that both reports were incorrect.
　When the atomic bomb exploded in the air approximately 500 m over Nagasaki, the three radiosondes were drifting down at an altitude of 4,000 m (Nishina Yoshio states in his memoir that they were at an altitude of 5,000 m). The radiosondes were carried eastward on the wind and fell at the following three points:

1st Point: Kamikawachi, Toishi Village (currently Kawachi-machi, Nagasaki City), approximately 11.6 km
2nd Point: Hotogi, Tayui Village (currently Iimori-chō, Isahaya City), approximately 12.5 km
3rd Point: Dake, Enoura Village (currently Iimori-chō, Isahaya City), approximately 13.3 km

The above figures indicate the direct distance from the hypocenter. All three radiosondes fell in the mountains directly east of the hypocenter, the three landing points being almost in alignment with each other. One of the radiosondes landed at the first point between 11:30 a.m. and 12:00 p.m. The time at which the other two radiosondes landed at the second and third points remains unclear due to the delay in their discovery and subsequent communication, but it is estimated that both landed between 12:00 p.m. and 1:00 p.m.
　In Kamikawachi, Toishi Village (first point), one of the three parachutes got caught in a persimmon tree on the hillside in a small valley, and the radiosonde fell into a field below. The people living in nine private residences nearby, shocked by the unexpected appearance of these objects, furiously rang their alarm bell. A similar uproar was caused in Tayui Village and Enoura Village, near Toishi Village.
　Ōno Kazuma (group leader of the Toishimura Defense Unit 1st Group at the time), Hayashida Jirō and other residents of Kamikawachi later described the uproar as follows:

The parachute came flying very low over Mt. Fugen (430 m). The black smoke rising from Nagasaki indicated that the city had been devastated. Seeing the parachute, we assumed that an enemy parachutist had floated down over our village. People working in the fields rushed to their homes to get knives, bamboo spears and wooden swords. When it became clear that no parachutist was involved, we concluded that a bomb had been dropped and hurriedly evacuated the elderly, women and children to shelters and shōgagama (ginger storage pits). Members of the Toishimura Defense Unit 1st Group remained outside to investigate the object we thought was a bomb. But since it did not explode, we began to doubt that it was a bomb. However, we stayed vigilant until the arrival of naval personnel.
　As soon as the object fell in our village, some members of the defense unit rushed to the headquarters to report the event. Approximately one hour later, a navy truck arrived from somewhere, perhaps Makishima Base. The police also arrived. After examining the object carefully and determining that it was not a bomb, the naval personnel carried the object (radiosonde) and parachute to the village office by truck.
　The object was a black cylinder approximately 30 cm in diameter and approximately 1.5 m in length. Hayashida Jirō and another man carried it from the valley, saying that it was not very heavy. One of the naval personnel said that he could hear something ticking inside it like a clock.
　The men spread the parachute out in front of the village office. It was huge and had one or two holes in it. The naval personnel believed that the holes had been created by flak from bunkers while the parachute drifted from Nagasaki to the mountains of Yagami. Shortly thereafter, naval personnel collected the object (radiosonde) and the police took the parachute away.

The radiosonde was carried to the naval officer housing unit in Isahaya, where the so-called “atomic bomb letter” addressed to Dr. Sagane Ryōkichi was discovered inside (to be discussed later in this section).
　At the second landing point in Hotogi, Tayui Village, the radiosonde fell in a place called Asebi, quite far from private residences. The military police in Nagasaki reported that the radiosonde fell in “a sweet potato field in Kobagō, Tayui Village.” The report also stated that “the object that landed in Tayui Village was identified by assistant military police,” indicating that the military police were the first to arrive in Tayui Village.
　The military police and defense unit members did not immediately examine the radiosonde but rather surrounded it at a distance and kept a vigil all night. The object was rumored to be a time bomb with huge explosive power, causing residents in Tayui Village to spend a restless night.
　As the name Dake (“high peak”) suggests, the area of Dake in Enoura Village, the third landing point, is located deep in mountain forests. The parachute carrying the radiosonde got caught in a tall chinquapin tree on a steep slope called Shinoki-gōshi. The people arriving there also mistook the radiosonde for a time bomb and considered moving it to an uninhabited area beyond the mountain, but instead the approximately ten families living in the area evacuated to a safe site while the defense unit kept vigil all night.
　On August 10, the military police picked up the radiosondes at Tayui Village and Enoura Village and took them to the Western Force Headquarters and then to the electrical engineering department at Kyūshū University.
　Each of the three radiosondes contained a letter to Dr. Sagane (Professor Sagane Ryōkichi of Tōkyō University) from three former American university colleagues. The three friends were working for the U.S. Atomic Bomb Command at the time. The American forces dropped the radiosondes not only to measure blast pressure and other parameters but also to urge Japan to immediately end the war. However, the letters would prove unnecessary: as already explained in the previous section, Japan had already decided to end the war in the middle of the night several hours earlier.
　“I don’t know why it was brought to us, but two paramilitaries arrived at the officers’ mess around 3:00 p.m. that day (August 9) carrying the radiosonde in a three-wheeled motor vehicle,” reports Kitamura Gunji, one of the persons who discovered the letter. Kitamura was engaged in the Engine Division of the Ōmura 21st Naval Air Arsenal as an engineer lieutenant junior grade (he later became chief of the electronics division at Yamaichi Trading Company). Due to the increasing air raids on Ōmura, the Engine Division (led by Captain Yasumoto Takenosuke) had been relocated to Isahaya City. The division factory was located south of Isahaya Park across the Honmyō River, and the Hishiya Ryokan Hotel in Tenman-machi was in use as an officers’ mess. Continues Kitamura:

My coworkers and I were taking a late lunch and talking about the Nagasaki atomic bombing and the parachute reportedly seen by a school cooperation unit. It was then that the object, tied up in a parachute, was carried to our mess and placed on the veranda. We rushed out of the dining hall to see it.
　At first we had no idea what it was. The object was a gray-colored steel cylinder with a four-blade rudder and several hooks to attach a parachute to the top. It looked like a strangely shaped model, with several holes in the body. Through the holes we could see something like vacuum tubes. Cautiously applying my ear to the metal, I heard a sound emanating from inside. My coworkers also listened for the sound. We concluded that the object was a remote controller for the bomb that had been dropped on Nagasaki. After a while, we found the letter.

Tsuda Yasuo, engineer lieutenant at the time and later director of Shōwa Aircraft Industry Co., Ltd., took more than ten photographs of the radiosonde after it was carried to the officers’ mess.
　On the day of the Nagasaki atomic bombing, Tsuda had been resting in Hishiya Ryokan Hotel, the site of the naval officers’ mess. He had noticed three B-29 bombers flying toward Nagasaki and heard the tremendous explosion that shook the walls of the officers’ mess like an earthquake. Tsuda later commented as follows about the radiosonde carried to the officers’ mess a few hours after the explosion:

I examined the object carefully on the veranda where it had been placed. I conjectured that one of the three B-29s had been loaded with a bomb and the other two had been carrying these objects as auxiliary equipment. I thought that the equipment had been dropped before the bomb in order to collect data, such as atmospheric pressure, temperature, wind speed and direction. I also thought that this data had been used to decide the flight path of the aircraft and other important matters regarding the bombing. I concluded that it was a kind of sensor. As my photographs indicate, the device had something like a crystal transmitter at the top and holes in the canister, through which several small vacuum tubes were visible. This led me to believe that the device was a sensor.
　At the same time, I could see gear wheels under the vacuum tubes and something like batteries at the bottom of the device. Since we had no mechanical expertise, the devise appeared to my coworkers and me to be some kind of ‘monster with vacuum tubes and gear wheels.’ Since I had heard that even a small atomic bomb could wield enormous explosive power, the device seemed very ominous indeed.
　The white envelope containing the letter was in a clear plastic bag affixed to the inside of the canister. I could see the envelope through the holes and the words “Dr. R. Sagane” written on the front. The envelope was not sealed, so I removed the letter and read it. If my memory serves me correctly, the letter conveyed the following message: ‘You conducted research on atomic power with us in the U.S. and you are fully aware of the enormous potential of this power. We have now completed an atomic bomb. If this bomb is used, innocent Japanese civilians will be killed and their country destroyed. We hope that you, as an expert in the field, will urge the Japanese government to immediately end the war.’
　Unfortunately, I was so preoccupied with the radiosonde that I did not think to take a photograph of the letter. I took photographs of the radiosonde from various angles, but neither the plastic bag nor the letter interested me.
　Unable to determine the nature of the device, my coworkers and I decided that it should be delivered to the authorities as soon as possible. Moreover, the message of the letter was highly controversial at the time. We agreed to keep what we had seen and read confidential. Since it was late at night, we stored the device in Isahaya for the time being, carrying it into a tunnel shelter on the north part of a rocky hill in Isahaya Park and roping off the shelter and putting up a sign saying ‘Authorized Personnel Only. Navy.’ I remember that the device was sent to the naval arsenal in Ōmura early the next morning. Now it was out of the hands of the engine division in Isahaya.
　When the war ended, I remained in Isahaya with a few of my coworkers to wind up our affairs. While we were there, we were asked about the atomic bombing by American investigators at the Hishiya Ryokan Hotel, the former naval officers’ mess. They also asked about the radiosonde, but I did not mention the photographs I had taken that day. We also received a visit from a Japanese atomic bomb research group comprised of Prof. Sagane and four or five others, presumably students. We assisted the group in its research activities on the atomic bombing of Nagasaki. While carrying out the research, the group stayed at the Hishiya Ryokan Hotel. At night, we talked about the atomic bombing with the group. We may also have discussed the radiosonde, but I am not sure. 134

The letter attached to the radiosonde was addressed to Dr. Sagane Ryōkichi and urged Japan to surrender. The text of the letter is as follows:

Headquarters
Atomic bomb command
August 9, 1945

To: Prof. R. Sagane
From: Three of your former scientific colleagues during your stay in the United States

We are sending this as a personal message to urge that you use your influence as a reputable nuclear physicist, to convince the Japanese General Staff of the terrible consequences which will be suffered by your people if you continue in this war.
　You have known for several years that an atomic bomb could be built if a nation were willing to pay the enormous cost of preparing the necessary material. Now that you have seen that we have constructed the production plants, there can be no doubt in your mind, that all the output of these factories, working 24 hours a day, will be exploded in your homeland.
　Within the space of three weeks, we have proof-fired one bomb in the American desert, exploded one in Hiroshima and delivered the third this morning.
　We implore you to confirm these facts to your leaders, and to do your utmost to stop the destruction and waste of life which can only result in the total immolation of all your cities if continued. As scientists, we deplore the use to which a beautiful discovery has been put, but we can assure you that unless Japan surrenders at once, this rain of atomic bombs will increase manyfold in fury. 135

Prof. Sagane received word of the letter from both the army and navy on August 10, the day after the Nagasaki atomic bombing, but he did not actually read it until September, when it was handed to him by Ensign Nishida of the former Sasebo Naval Headquarters during his visit to Nagasaki as a member of an atomic bomb research group. The message was carbon-copied on ordinary letter paper. When he read the letter, he had no idea who the “former scientific colleagues” were.
　Only later would he learn that the letter had been written by three researchers including Luis W. Alvarez, with whom Sagane had worked at the Radiation Laboratory, University of California before the outbreak of World War Two. In 1949, Sagane went to the U.S. and met Alvarez and later wrote about the meeting as follows:

　I heard that the ‘atomic letter’ had been attached to each of the three radiosondes dropped on Nagasaki,
　which reminded me of the carbon copy. Moreover, Alvarez showed me blast pressure curve charts. The
　blast pressure data had been transmitted by the radiosondes dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The
　lines on the charts were flat at first and then climbed sharply, indicating the intensity of the blast
　pressure at the time of the atomic bombing explosions. 136

The radiosondes transmitted accurate data regarding the atomic bombing as they drifted over Nagasaki. But what ever became of them?
　As outlined above, the radiosonde that fell to the ground in Kamikawachi, Toishi Village was sent from the Engine Division in Isahaya to the arsenal in Ōmura, then to Sasebo Naval Headquarters and finally to the Radio Inspection Section in the Radio Factory at the Sasebo Naval Arsenal.
　Ōta Tadateru, an employee in the section (and later Denki Kōgyō Co., Ltd.), remembered the radiosonde as follows:

It was around August 11 when the radiosonde arrived from Sasebo Naval Headquarters in a wooden box padded with cotton. Our mission was to clarify the relationship between the radiosonde and the atomic bombing. Although seven persons, including Asashima Takeo, naval engineer lieutenant commander, dismantled and examined the radiosonde, they could not determine the purpose of the device. Finally, around August 13, they decided to send the radiosonde to the Naval Technology Research Department.
　My coworkers and I repacked the radiosonde in the box, but just as we were preparing to send it, the war ended, so we carried the box in a bicycle trailer to the officers’ mess in Yamanota, Kasuga-machi, where the radio factory had been relocated to escape air raids during the war. On the way, I considered throwing the box into the sea from the third wharf. However, we decided against this because the American forces would obviously demand to examine the box because it had some connection with the atomic bombing.
　Around September 7, American Occupation forces landed at Sasebo. It was around September 13 that we carried the radiosonde in a bicycle trailer from Yamanota to City Hall, which had been requisitioned for use as occupation headquarters. We handed over the radiosonde to the first lieutenant in charge of radio equipment.

Meanwhile, the radiosondes picked up by the military police in Tayui Village and Enoura Village were sent to the headquarters of the Western Forces and then to the Faculty of Engineering at Kyūshū University.
　In July 1965, the Kyūshū University Faculty of Engineering donated the canister of one of the radiosondes to Nagasaki City through Deputy Mayor Suzuta Masatake. Said Prof. Irie Fujio in a document sent along with the canister:

After the atomic bombing of Nagasaki, the then Western Forces sent the two radiosondes to the Kyūshū University Faculty of Engineering along with a request for information on the nature of the devices. Shortly afterward, the war ended, and the radiosondes went into storage at the university (the electronic equipment inside was returned to the U.S. shortly after the war). The two radiosondes were identical in appearance. One of the radiosondes was later lost, and only the duralumin canister of the other remained.

Currently, the canister of the radiosonde is displayed along with other exhibits at the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum.

3. Psychological Warfare Leaflets

During World War II, American aircraft dropped psychological warfare leaflets over the Japanese archipelago. Different types were dropped at different times.
　Unofficial records indicate that American aircraft dropped the first psychological warfare leaflets over Nagasaki on March 18, 1945.
　The American forces had commenced large-scale indiscriminate bombings, such as the Tōkyō air raid on March 10, around the same time. In response to these leaflets, the Japanese Ministry of Home Affairs in March promulgated an ordinance entitled “Regarding Enemy Document Reporting” obliging those who picked up leaflets to report them to the authorities and prohibiting people from keeping the leaflets in their possession.
　The ordinance was in effect in the spring of 1945 when large numbers of leaflets were scattered over Nagasaki with messages in Japanese. Most of these messages were abstract in content, like “In April, Nagasaki the city of flowers; in August, Nagasaki the city of ashes,” intended specifically to undermine the morale of the Japanese public.
　
Leaflets warning of air raids

The end of the war was imminent. The Potsdam Declaration was issued on July 26, outlining the final terms of surrender for Japan. As early as July 27, the U.S. Strategic Air Forces began to drop large quantities of leaflets over Japanese cities warning of air raids. Small B-29 bombing units dropped these on missions that were referred to by Japanese people sarcastically as “daily service runs.” 137
　The leaflets named cities that the U.S. Strategic Air Command planned to attack. Emblazoned with the headline “Warning to the Japanese People,” they predicted that the specified cities would suffer severe air raids unless Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration and surrendered immediately.
　Winston Churchill, British Prime Minister at the time, mentions the leaflets in his epic study “The Second World War”:

Eventually it was decided to send an ultimatum calling for an immediate unconditional surrender of the armed forces of Japan. The document was published on July 26… The terms [of the document] were rejected by the military rulers of Japan, and the United States Air Force made its plans accordingly to cast one atomic bomb on Hiroshima and one on Nagasaki.
　We agreed to give every chance to the inhabitants. The procedure was developed in detail. In order to minimise the loss of life eleven Japanese cities were warned by leaflets on July 27 that they would be subjected to intensive air bombardment. Next day six of them were attacked. Twelve more were warned on July 31, and four were bombed on August 1. The last warning was given on August 5. By then the Superfortresses claimed to have dropped a million and a half leaflets every day and three million copies of the ultimatum. 138

It is doubtful that the purpose of dropping leaflets was to minimize the loss of life, as Churchill suggests. It is true, nevertheless, that the leaflets were dropped over Japanese cities in considerable quantities prior to indiscriminate bombings. However, no evidence has been found to show that leaflets warning of the atomic bombing were scattered over Nagasaki.

Leaflets urging surrender

After the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, so-called “surrender-urging leaflets” were dropped in considerable quantities over Japanese cities. These leaflets emphasized the great power of the atomic bomb and urged Japan to cease armed resistance and to immediately surrender according to the 13 articles of the Potsdam Declaration.
　The leaflets urging surrender were characterized by their unique titles and ending phrases, which could be interpreted as either warnings or threats. Written entirely in Japanese, the leaflets started with “Warning to the Japanese People! Evacuate the City Immediately!” and ended with the same message expressed differently: “Evacuate the City Immediately.”
　Scattered throughout the country, the leaflets implied that another atomic bomb would soon be dropped, not only on one of the atomic bombing targets, but possibly on any Japanese city. It is noteworthy that, unlike the leaflets warning of air raids, the surrender-urging leaflets did not specify the next bombing target.
　Leaflets urging surrender were scattered in considerable quantities over Nagasaki, and some can be seen today at the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum. Were they dropped before or after the atomic bombing of Nagasaki? This question has been discussed and examined in great detail over the years. Many witnesses state in recollections and memoirs that leaflets fell from the sky on the night of August 9 or the morning of August 10, suggesting that they were dropped after the atomic bombing. On the other hand, some people claimed to have picked up leaflets before the atomic bombing, raising the possibility that they were dropped both before and after the atomic bombing. Although the facts remain to be confirmed, the leaflets exhibited at the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum were all dropped after the atomic bombing.
　To understand the essential meaning and purpose of the surrender-urging leaflets, it is important to determine under what circumstances the leaflets were created, how it was decided to drop them, how they were made, and in what situation they were picked up. Various sources such as official U.S. documents and recollections from witnesses in Nagasaki shed light on these questions.

Surrender Recommendation Leaflet (front)

Japanese people beware!
You must leave the city immediately!

Carefully read the contents of this leaflet.

The United States has achieved the previously impossible task of creating a bomb of immense power. Just one of these newly developed atomic bombs has more power than all the bombs carried by a squadron of 2,000 B-29s. You must carefully consider this fearful fact, which we swear to be the absolute truth.

We have now begun to use this weapon on Japan. If you still have any doubt, we urge you to go and investigate the effects of the single atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima.

Surrender Recommendation Leaflet (back)

We hope that you will request your emperor to terminate this war before we use the bomb to destroy all the military powers that are prolonging this futile conflict.

The president of the United States recently submitted to your country an outline of 13 conditions for an honorable surrender. We advise you to accept these conditions and to begin construction of a new, peace-loving Japan. You must immediately take measures to halt all military resistance.

If you do not, we will use this bomb and every other excellent weapon at our disposal to quickly and forcefully end the present war.

Leave the city immediately!

This message was copied from a handwritten original and printed on the front and back of pieces of paper about the size of postcards (105 mm long by 136 mm wide). They were found on the ground in central Nagasaki and surrounding towns and villages to the north, east and southeast, such as Nagayo, Tayui and Mogi.
　The following information is derived from official American documents related to the preparation and scattering of propaganda leaflets.

Preparation of leaflets and psychological warfare

(a) On August 7, the Psychological Warfare Office of the U.S. Pacific Fleet decided to initiate a psychological campaign with the atomic bomb as a focal point. The Office of War Information (OWI) provided facilities for the campaign. The Saipan headquarters of the Psychological Warfare Office, U.S. Pacific Fleet began work on final arrangements for the campaign.

(b) An officer of the U.S. Pacific Fleet Command drafted a psychological warfare leaflet. The plan was to drop 3.6 million leaflets daily for nine days over Japanese cities with populations over 100,000.

(c) The draft was sent to and approved by the 20th Air Force Corps in Guam, the U.S. Army Strategic Air Forces Headquarters and the U.S. Pacific Fleet Command. Immediately thereafter, an American officer with Japanese language ability translated the draft with the aid of Japanese P.O.W. officers who had been ordered to assist in the campaign. Subsequently, a fair copy of the translated draft was made with a Japanese writing brush and sent to Saipan, where a printing plate for the copy was made and the copy printed as a leaflet.

(d) (omitted)

(e) The plan was to transfer, on August 9, the first leaflet bombs to the 73rd Wing, which was responsible for delivery. The plan called for daily delivery, for nine days, of 75 M-16 bomb cases, each containing 32,000 leaflets.

(f) This plan was discontinued due to Soviet Russia’s declaration of war on August 9. The leaflet text was partially rewritten… A fair copy of the draft was made with a Japanese writing brush by a Japanese P.O.W. The completed leaflet was called AB-12; the previous version was called AB-11. On the morning of August 10, AB-11 was replaced by AB-12. 139

The leaflets exhibited at the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum belong to the AB-11 category.
　Of particular interest is the comment that, “The plan was to transfer, on August 9, the first leaflet bombs to the 73rd Wing, which was responsible for delivery.”
　The American forces dropped the leaflets as part of their psychological warfare campaign. Since the leaflets call on people to “evacuate the city immediately,” it was once believed that the leaflets were intended not to encourage surrender but to warn in advance that an atomic bomb might be dropped on Nagasaki. In view of the fact that the leaflets were produced as part of the propaganda campaign, however, it is reasonable to assume that their principal purpose was to urge Japan to surrender as soon as possible.
　The U.S. Army Secret Intelligence Report Center handled highly confidential telegrams, some of which referred to the leaflets used in the propaganda campaign. The following outlines such references (the telegrams below are paraphrased from the atomic-bombing-related code telegram collection in What the Tinian Files Tell Us).

Telegram of August 6

This confidential telegram was sent from Henry Arnold, Commander of the U.S. Army Air Forces, to Carl Spaatz, Commanding General of the U.S Army Strategic Air Forces. It seems that the telegram was sent immediately after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. How to implement the psychological operation was left to the discretion of Brigadier General Farrell on Tinian (the deputy of General Groves in Washington). It was decided that, while the U.S. Army ordered Farrell to investigate how to promote the operation, the Army would provide as much support as they could.

Telegram of August 7

This telegram was sent from Brigadier General Farrell, to whom operation decisions had been entrusted on the previous day, to Groves’ secretary in Washington. The telegram can be paraphrased as follows:

- As a result of discussion with U.S. Pacific Fleet Headquarters and Strategic Air Forces Headquarters, it was arranged that both parties would offer full support.
- Maj. Moynahan, Adjutant, was making arrangements to gain support in Saipan from the navy and air force in terms of photoprinting, copiers, translators and writers.
- The plan would be mapped out by the next morning.
- Details of the plan would be reported on the following day.
- The procedures took considerable time, which impeded effective communication in implementing the operation.

(Note: The above telegram, referring to the complex procedures, suggests that on August 7, Farrell was very busy dealing with a wide variety of procedures, examining concrete plan measures and preparing for implementation of the plan. Moreover, it seems that he was ordered not to reveal any information regarding the operation without special permission from Washington.)

The First Telegram on August 8

This telegram was sent from Brigadier General Farrell to the secretary of General Groves, suggesting the concrete measures that Farrell had said in his telegram of August 7 that he could report on August 8. He suggested and reported the following:

Suggestion:
1) Dropping approximately 16 million leaflets for nine days on 47 Japanese cities with populations over 100,000, i.e., more than 40% of Japan’s total population.
2) ...(omission)
3) Using three “Polly” Aircraft (aircraft with special loud speaker system), as soon as they became available.

For this leaflet operation,
1. The printing factory of the Office of War Information has a maximum production capacity of 1.8 million leaflets in 24 hours, enough for 75 T3 bombs (*T3, a bomb into which leaflets were rolled, was used to drop the leaflets).
2. Three B-29s are needed per day for nine days. This critical number of aircraft was being requested of General Spaatz.

It is expected that Moynahan (Adjutant) will go to Guam today (on August 8), to coordinate the plan with General Spaatz... It is expected that the leaflet operation will start within 36 hours...

(Note: As of August 8, the concrete plan measures were finalized. The psychological operation constituted leaflet dropping and radio broadcasting.)

The Second (Supplementary) Telegram on August 8

This telegram was sent confidentially from Farrell to O’Leary, Groves’ secretary, through the U.S. Army Report Center. The telegram reports the following:

In Guam today, Moynahan has coordinated our plan with the 20th Air Force Corps of the United States Army Strategic Air Forces and Pacific Fleet Headquarters.

LeMay (Commander of the 20th Air Force Corps) authorized the 73rd Wing to commence dropping the leaflets at 11:00 on the 9th, Japan local time. Our first leaflet draft, which was approved by the Strategic Air Forces and then translated, is now being printed in Saipan.

(Note: of particular note is the approved time for leaflet drop commencement.)

The Third and Forth Telegram on August 8

In addition to the above two telegrams, two more telegrams were sent on August 8; a total of four telegrams were sent that day. One of the two additional telegrams can be paraphrased as follows:

Special staff members have been sent to the 73rd Bomb Wing at the command to take part in the leaflet bombing, a special bombing operation... Our Headquarters will determine takeoff, route, target and other parameters, through procedures similar to those used for weather reconnaissance operations.

... We would like to have permission to add the phrase “Evacuate the City Immediately!” to the text of our first version of the leaflets.

(Note: the above telegrams suggest that as of August 8, those involved in the leaflet-dropping operation were hurriedly preparing for the operation in Saipan. As of that time, they had not yet dropped the leaflets, as is indicated by the previously referenced phrase “(e) The plan was to transfer, on August 9, the first leaflet bombs to the 73rd Wing, which was responsible for delivery” in Atomic Bombing Report.)

The Telegram on August 9

This telegram was sent from Arnold, Commander of the Army Air Forces to Spaatz, Commanding General of the Strategic Air Forces, and Brigadier General Farrell. The telegram states the following:

It is believed that this propaganda operation using atomic bombs is within the framework of U.S. propaganda policy...

(Note: It seems that the purpose of this telegram was to make sure that the leaflet operation should be promoted carefully. As of August 9, details of the atomic bombs were still confidential)

None of the above documents provides any evidence that the leaflets were dropped before August 9.

The following recollections, written by people of Nagasaki, also mention the leaflets, although they differ as to when the leaflets were dropped. While a report by the military police in Nagasaki states that the leaflets were dropped “in the middle of the night of August 9,” many of the memoirs written by civilians say that they were dropped “in the early or late morning of August 10.”
　Ide Ichirō, at the time a second-year student in the medical course at Nagasaki Medical College, remembers as follows:

A horse had collapsed on the slope leading to the college hospital… I found a number of people near the boiler at the top of the slope, including Dr. Shirabe and Dr. Osajima.
　Dr. Shirabe and Dr. Osajima showed me a leaflet that they had been reading. The leaflet was printed with the words ‘Evacuate the City Immediately.’ The following are a few of the characteristics of the leaflet that I recall: 1) The prose sounded unnatural to Japanese ears; 2) The block letters were obviously intended to catch people’s attention; 3) Nagasaki was not named in the leaflet, indicating that it had been printed for use anywhere in Japan other than Hiroshima; 4) It must have been printed after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima.
　If the leaflet had been dropped before the atomic bombing of Nagasaki, it is unlikely that the doctors would have found it on the scorched surface of the fields. For this reason, it seemed logical to me to assume that the leaflet had been dropped on the morning of August 10. 140

Tomonaga Yoshinobu, an employee at the Mitsubishi Arms Factory Ōhashi Plant, remembers as follows:

On the morning of August 10, the day following the atomic bombing, I left my cousin’s company-owned house in Maruta, Nagayo Village and headed alone for Nagasaki… I crossed over the mountain and reached the Kawahira Road, where I saw pieces of paper scattered in the fields. I picked up one of the papers and found that it was a leaflet urging surrender and scattered by American aircraft. This leaflet reported that Nagasaki had been devastated the previous day by an atomic bomb, a weapon with immense explosive power. 141

Maeda Michio, a former employee at the Mitsubishi Nagasaki Shipyard, remembers as follows:

At that time, my company was working hard to construct small manned torpedoes. The design division was trying frantically to procure materials for torpedoes, and some of the staff members were away on related business trips. The morning after the atomic bombing (August 10), I went to the Urakami district to check on the friends and families of the absent staff members. On the street in Irabayashi, I picked up one of the leaflets that had been dropped by aircraft. The leaflet stated that the American forces had dropped a powerful new type of bomb and that many more of these bombs would be dropped if we did not immediately surrender. 142

Hamagata Kazuo, an employee in Hull Factory No.1 at the Mitsubishi Nagasaki Shipyard, remembers as follows:

The next day (August 10), I dug through the ruins of my home in Saiwai-machi with a shovel and hoe, hoping to find the remains of my wife… but in vain.
　It was a hot summer day. Naked from the waist up, I continued digging, drinking directly from a broken water pipe. While digging, I saw enemy aircraft fly overhead, but I no longer had the will to take shelter. I thought, “if you want to hit me, go ahead! Do whatever you like!” It was then that pieces of white paper fell from the sky. Wondering what they were, I picked one up and found that it was an American psychological warfare leaflet. I hurriedly tucked it into my pocket; I was afraid that if the military police, the civilian police or someone else saw me reading the leaflet I might be arrested. I thought that I could read it somewhere else. On the way to my damaged house in Inasa, carrying the digging equipment on my shoulder, I took the leaflet out of my pocket and read it. 143

The military police in Nagasaki reported as follows:

In the middle of the night of August 9, enemy aircraft dropped a single type of leaflet in considerable quantities over Nagasaki City and Tayui Village, the previously mentioned area. The leaflets boasted about the power of the new-type bomb and urged the Japanese people to end the war and seek peace. The military police are now collecting the leaflets in cooperation with the civilian police. We have collected 1,200 so far.

In a section in the report entitled “Analysis of Trends in Public Feelings,” the military police in Nagasaki mention the leaflets as follows:

It is not believed that the enemy leaflets have affected the views of the general public. However, it is anticipated that the enemy will take every opportunity to promote this type of propaganda operation, which will considerably affect the general public. It is necessary to enforce tight security measures. Although no pernicious rumors have been circulated so far, we will continue vigilant monitoring.

Needless to say, however, the atomic bombing caused great shock among the general public in different ways, and many people expressed their desperation openly.
　Regarding the leaflets, Tomokiyo Katsumi, sub-chief of the Nagasaki Prefectural Guard Unit, remembers as follows:

Around 7:00 p.m., I was sent out again. I had to walk all the way this time, with a cap on my head, a police club in my hand, and a steel helmet on my back. I had orders from Governor Nagano to bring doctors from the college hospital… But the city neighborhoods were engulfed in flames, making it impossible to pass. My company was able to proceed as far as Urakami Railroad Station. The building had collapsed but was still not burning. None of the station employees were around. Perhaps they had all been killed instantly. I was informed that soldiers were trapped in the debris and calling for help. We dug through the debris and rescued them (two or three soldiers I think).
　I don’t remember what time it was when we finished the rescue effort; it might have been 1:00 a.m. or 2:00 a.m. I heard a roaring sound in the direction of Togitsu and saw a flash of light. Enemy aircraft! I was gripped with fear, but the sound faded away in the direction of Mt. Inasa and nothing special occurred after that.
　We left Urakami Railroad Station for the Mitsubishi Steelworks. I went into the office, where I found dead bodies lined up neatly on the floor. There were about 50 bodies… I prayed for their souls.
　We left the steelworks for Yanagawa Bridge, the next bridge upstream from Inasa Bridge. The starlight and embers in the ruins illuminated the area. We took a rest on Yanagawa Bridge.
　Early in the morning, one of the company members shouted, ‘There are leaflets on the ground!’ The leaflets were scattered upstream from the bridge, over an area approximately 100 meters by 40 meters, mainly on the Takenokubo side of Urakami River. I picked one of them up and found to my surprise that it was an American psychological warfare leaflet. Waking everybody, I gave the order: ‘Pick up all the leaflets!’
　The leaflets were lying on the shore, roads and smoldering houses, some of top of each other. The aircraft of the previous night must have dropped them, I thought. The leaflets reminded me of the roar of engines and flash of light I had noticed while working at Urakami Railroad Station.
　‘They dropped the leaflets after the new-type bomb!’ I felt very angry. At the same time, I thought that I could not allow the leaflets to be read by the general public. I ordered my men to pick up all the leaflets. As a result, we collected a total of about 300 leaflets. Since we finished collecting them early in the morning, there was no one around. I don’t remember exactly what was written on the leaflets, except the message that the same type of bomb that had destroyed Hiroshima had been dropped on Nagasaki, devastating the Urakami district. Some of the men may have read the leaflets but none of them asked me any particular questions. Everybody continued collecting them, without saying a word.
　While picking them up, one of my men found a strange object that looked like part of a bombshell. After a while, another man found a similar object and the head of a fuse in the schoolyard at Keihō Middle School. At that time, we had no idea what they were.
　I rushed to the Defense Headquarters in Tateyama-machi and reported the leaflets. This information was then relayed to the military police.
　I don’t know what happened after that, but I guess that the military police went to the site to make sure that all the leaflets had been collected.

Kurosaki Takao (Wakakusa-machi), who picked up a psychological warfare leaflet before the atomic bombing, remembers as follows:

I picked up a leaflet on Funatsu Bridge on August 7. The leaflet warned that an atomic bomb would be dropped. I’m sure that I picked it up on August 7. I do not remember there being very many leaflets in the area near Funatsu Bridge. The military police threatened to arrest anyone in possession of an American psychological warfare leaflet, so I read it quickly and then threw it into the river. The leaflet stated that an atomic bomb had been dropped on Hiroshima and that another one would be dropped soon. Each letter in the leaflet consisted of dots, rather than solid lines. I don’t think there was a message printed on the back, but I’m not sure. Around 4:00 on August 9, my house in Funatsu-machi caught fire and I took shelter in Nishiyama. After that day [the day of the atomic bombing] I remained outside Nagasaki, so I’m sure I picked up the leaflet before the atomic bombing. However, I discarded the leaflet and didn’t keep a diary, so I don’t have any proof. Although I heard that the leaflets were dropped after the atomic bombing, I’m sure that I picked one up on August 7. The other day, I was talking with my friends about when the leaflets were dropped, before or after the atomic bombing. I made a call to the Atomic Bomb Museum.

Testimonies of this sort abound, but the question of when the leaflets were dropped remains unsolved.
　Kusumoto Toshikazu, an employee at the Mitsubishi Nagasaki Shipyard, reports seeing these leaflets falling from the sky on the morning of August 9 outside Nagasaki Prefecture:

At the fateful moment on that fateful day, August 9, I was stationed in Yakuin, Fukuoka Prefecture, as a member of the 8063rd Unit, Western Forces. I heard the radio broadcast warning all people in Nagasaki to evacuate immediately and assumed that American forces had landed on Nagasaki Peninsula, which caused me to worry about Nagasaki, my hometown. Unit Headquarters had already been informed about the tremendous explosive power of the new-type bomb dropped on Hiroshima on August 6. I saw American leaflets—white pieces of paper about 10 cm in length and width—falling from the sky. A warning that another atomic bomb would be dropped on the morning of August 9 was printed on the leaflets. 144

4. Unimplemented Fire Bombing and Other Bombing Plans

The project to develop and drop atomic bombs was top secret. No one in Japan knew about it. Even in the U.S., few people outside a tiny group of government and military leaders were aware of the project. Moreover, Nagasaki was not placed on the list of targets until July 25, 1945. It is likely that those in charge of planning conventional air raids knew nothing about the atomic bomb.
　Two projects were afoot to subject Nagasaki to conventional air raids, but these were never implemented because of the atomic bombing. The information on these plans is useful to the present discussion, nevertheless, because they share several features including target points.
　The American air force used the term “flag plan” to refer to draft plans for air raid operations, and two different flag plans were proposed for an attack on Nagasaki.
　Devised on July 18, 1945, one of these called for the destruction of the city with incendiary bombs and included daytime and nighttime air raids.
　Devised on August 4, 1945, the other flag plan sought to destroy the Mitsubishi Steelworks and Mitsubishi Arms Factory with bombs during a daytime air raid.
　The daytime bombing plan devised on July 18 designated a total of five points as MPI (mean point of impact): three points in the Nakashima River basin and two in the Urakami River basin. Eight military units were needed to execute this plan. (Note: in the case of the atomic bombing, only a single aiming point was designated.)
　The plan for a nighttime raid designated two points as MPI: one point in the downstream area of Urakami River and the other in the city center downstream along Nakashima River. Eight military units were also needed for this plan. A reference map printed with the word “Nagasaki City” was used to designate the MPI for these firebombing plans. This map differed from that used for the atomic bombing of Nagasaki.
　The daytime bombing plan devised on August 4 designated two points as MPI and called for nine military units equipped with 2,000-pound GPs (one-ton bombs).
　The atomic bomb exploded over Nagasaki on August 9 and destroyed both of the MPI mentioned above, making it no longer necessary to carry out the conventional air raids. The reference map used to determine the MPI for the plan was called “Litho-Mosaic of 21st Bomber Command (Nagasaki Mitsubishi Steelworks and Arms Factory: 90.36-546)”; it was also used to designate the Nagasaki atomic bomb aiming point.
　As mentioned above, the daytime firebombing plan devised on July 18 designated two points as MPI in the Urakami River basin. “067145” is one of the MPI located upstream. Coincidentally, “067145” was near the atomic bombing hypocenter.
　U.S. documents state that bombs containing rolled-up psychological warfare leaflets were dropped at 12:11 on August 10, Japan local time. 145

___________________________
134 Interview with Tsuda Yasuo. ^
135 http://www.lettersofnote.com/2009/12/this-rain-of-atomic-bombs-will-increase.html ^
136 Yomiuri Shimbun, ed., The Emperor in Shōwa History ^
137 Ōmori Minoru, The Emperor and the Atomic Bombs-Postwar Secret History Vol.2 ^
138 Winston Churchill, The Second World War Vol.6: Triumph and Tragedy (Houghton Mifflin Company Boston, 1953) ^
139 Atomic Bombing Report ^
140 Association for Bereaved Families of Atomic Bomb Victims of the Former Nagasaki Medical College (ed.), Wasuregusa (Forget-Me-Not), Vol.5 ^
141 Tomonaga Yoshinobu, Genbaku zengo (Before and After the Atomic Bombing) Vol.12, edited by Hideo Shirai) ^
142 Maeda Michio, Genbaku zengo (Before and After the Atomic Bombing) Vol.2, edited by
Hideo Shirai) ^
143 Hamagata Kazuo, Genbaku zengo (Before and After the Atomic Bombing) Vol.15, edited by Hideo Shirai) ^
144 Kusumoto Juichi, Genbaku zengo (Before and After the Atomic Bombing) Vol.53, edited by Hideo Shirai) ^
145 From documents in the possession of Kudō Yōzō ^

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